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This paper analyzes social spending in the impact of IMF-supported programs on
fiscal adjustment and social expenditures. We use a data base on public health and
education spending information covering 146 countries over the 1985-2000 period.
The paper uses Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model techniques
as well as a two-stage estimation method to correct for the endogeneity of Fund pro-
grams. Contrary to common perceptions, our findings show that social spending does
not decline under IMF-supported programs. However, we show that this does not ne-
cessarily means that the most vulnerable groups are protected from the effects of eco-
nomic adjustment.
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Resumen
Este articulo analiza el impacto de los programas economicos del Fondo Monetario
Internacional sobre el gasto social utilizando una base de datos de gasto publico en edu-
cacion y sanidad que cubre 146 paises durante el periodo 1985-2000. El trabajo utiliza un
modelo ARIMA y un sistema de estimacion en dos etapas para corregir la endogeneidad
asociada a los programas del Fondo Monetario. Contrariamente a las percepciones comu-
nes, nuestros resultados muestran que el gasto social no se reduce bajo los programas del
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(1) The views expressed in this Background Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent those of the IMF, IMF policy or the IEO. Background Papers report analyses related to the work of
the IEO and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
An earlier version of this paper was published as the first Background Paper of the International Mone-
tary Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office. Many people provided useful comments to earlier versions of
the draft but we are particularly grateful to Marcelo Selowsky, Tsidi Tsikata, and Carlos Mulas-Granados. All
remaining errors are ours alone.FMI. Sin embargo, nuestros resultados no permiten concluir que los grupos mas vulnera-
bles de la poblacion sean protegidos de los programas de ajuste.
Palabras clave: gasto social, educacion, sanidad, FMI, impacto programas, politica fis-
cal.
I. Introduction
Critics of the Fund have argued that IMF policy recommendations with their em-
phasis on fiscal adjustment —through a combination of tax increases and seemingly
drastic reductions in public expenditures— have had a devastating effect on the poor.
For example, Naiman and Watkins (1999) of the Center for Economic and Policy Re-
search have argued that “there is an urgent need for increased attention to the provi-
sion of basic social services. However, IMF adjustment programs restrict access to
health services and public education in two key ways: by reducing household in-
comes, and by reducing public (government) spending”. Similarly, the Bretton Woods
project, a well-known critic of Washington-based international financial institutions
notes that “in the face of public exhortations to greater spending on social services,
low income country governments however find themselves trapped by Fund diktat on
budget balances, inflation and interest rates”. Other NGO’s such as Global Exchange
have pointed out that “the subordination of social needs to the concerns of financial
markets has made it more difficult for national governments to ensure that their peo-
ple receive food, health care, and education”.
Although there are many statements about the negative impact of the IMF on so-
cial spending, there is very limited empirical evidence systematically assessing this
question. This paper uses time-series cross-section data to investigate the impact of
IMF-supported programs on public sector social spending and shed new light on this
issue. Social expenditures are measured with annual data of government spending
on health and education complied by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the
IMF (2) and verified and checked for accuracy by staff of country desks. The dataset
covers 146 countries during the period 1985-2000. The basic statistical framework
underlying the analysis relates social spending in a particular country and year to the
presence of an IMF program that year and to a set of (control) variables that may also
influence the levels of social spending (3). In order to achieve results as robust as
possible, we used four different indicators for education and health expenditures
(Table 1): as share of GDP, as share of total government expenditures, as an index of
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(2) See Baqir (2002) for a description and coverage.
(3) That is, we will start by estimating an equation of the form:
Sit = Xit + *IMFit + it [1]
where Sit measures social spending in country i in period t; IMFit is one or more variables indicating the pre-
sence of a Fund arrangement in period t; Xit is the set of control variables (e.g. all other factors determining
S); and it is an error term. The problems of this model (serial correlation and unit roots, endogeneity of
Fund programs, etc.) and the possible mechanisms to deal with them are discussed below.real expenditures at domestic prices (4), and in as expressed US Dollars per
capita (5).
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we describe the general characteristics
of the dataset and compare the mean values of each indicator for periods with and
without a Fund program. We then proceed to compare periods with and without a
Fund program in the same country. This is useful as a reference point for the rest of
the analysis, although it has severe limitations as a measure of the actual impact of
IMF-supported programs on social spending.
Second, we discuss ways of addressing these limitations and obtaining a better
measure of the impact of Fund-supported programs on social spending. Third, we ex-
plore the sensitivity of the results to the selection of countries in the sample and to the
econometric specification of the model. We conclude with a summary of the main les-
sons and findings, and also discuss the limitations of our approach and identify possi-
ble areas for further research.
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(4) In the absence of a sector-specific price index, social expenditures were deflated by the general
Consumer Price Index. Expenditures in US Dollars were calculated at the annual average exchange rate, and
delfated by the US Wholesale Price Index.
(5) It is not clear a priori that one indicator is better than others. Social expenditures as a percentage
of GDP measure the overall macroeconomic importance of social expenditures using the size of the eco-
nomy as a comparative benchmark. Social expenditures as a share of government spending provide a mea-
sure of fiscal priorities within the budget, and is thus a more direct indicator of the degree to which po-
licy-makers wish to commit resources to the social sector. Finally, social expenditures per capita provide a
better measure of the amount of direct or indirect resources that citizens receive from the state.
TABLE 1
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE VARIABLES (INDICATORS) USED IN THE STUDY
Description Observations Mean Standard
deviation
Health expenditure variables
1. Share of GDP ................. 1452 2.22 1.51
2. Share of total expenditures ........ 1462 7.25 3.82
3. Per capita, at real domestic prices (in-
dex, country average, 1985-2000 = 100) 1418 100 29.86
4. Per capita, in US dollars .......... 1424 6.06 9.43
Education expenditure variables
5. Share of GDP ................. 1452 4.17 1.98
6. Share of total expenditures ........ 1465 14.27 5.22
7. Per capita, at real domestic prices (in-
dex, country average, 1985-2000=100). 1413 100 25.28
8. Per capita, in US dollars .......... 1419 10.20 14.84
Source: IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department.II. Determinants of Social Expenditures and the Impact of
IMF-Supported Programs
An Evolving Focus
In its first fifty years of operation, the IMF paid limited attention to social spending
and social issues such as poverty and the distribution of income. The IMF’s role was to
promote international monetary cooperation, the balanced growth of international
trade, and to ensure a stable system of exchange rates. Although these fundamental in-
stitutional objectives are still in place, in the late 1980s and 1990s social policy issues
increasingly acquired more importance in the activities of the IMF’s (6).
Some recent empirical research by IMF staff suggests that average social spending
in IMF-supported programs over the last two decades has increased. For example
Gupta et al. (2000) show that for 65 of the 107 countries with IMF-supported programs
during 1985-97, government spending on education and health care increased, on av-
erage, both as a percentage of GDP and in real per capita terms (7).
Over the last two decades there has been a large body of research focusing on the
impact of IMF-supported programs (8). Despite this large research output, we know of
no studies that that have tried to isolate the impact of the IMF on social expendi-
tures (9). Though the neglect is understandable in retrospect, since social expendi-
tures per se have not been at the core of the IMF’s areas of responsibility, their in-
creased importance in both the IMF’s surveillance operations as well as program
design now call for greater attention. In the case of PRGF-supported programs, pov-
erty and social sectors issues have become central elements. Hence, we believe that,
in providing the first systematic attempt to obtain rigorous and robust estimates of the
impact of IMF-supported programs on social expenditures, this study provides a use-
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(6) For example, as the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF (see its Pamphlet 52, The IMF and the
Poor, p.1) notes that “in earlier periods the IMF’s policy advice emphasized the management of aggregate
demand with the aim of creating conditions for macroeconomic stability. In recent years, the focus and the
scope of the IMF’s work have broadened, and the structural and social aspects of fiscal policy have become
increasingly important, both in programs that the IMF supports in members undertaking reforms (IMF-sup-
ported programs) and in its general policy advice.”
(7) The authors document how the share in GDP of spending increased by 0.3 percentage points du-
ring the program period (about eight years on average), while in per capita terms social spending increased
by 2.4 percent a year.
(8) This has included work on the impact of Fund programs on growth: Bagci and Perraudin (1997),
Barro and Lee (2001), Conway (1994), Dicks-Mireaux and Hutchinson (2001), Mecagni and Schadler (2000),
and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000); on fiscal adjustment: Bulir and Moon (2003); on income distribution:
Garuda (2000) and Easterly (2001); on private capital flows: Rodrik (1996), Bird and Rowlands (1997, 2001),
and Ergin (1999). There has also been considerable work on other key macroeconomic issues such as infla-
tion and the current account.
(9) Our work builds on previous research by Gupta, Clements and Tiongson (1998) from the IMF’s
Fiscal Affairs Department, who show that since the mid-1980s real per capita spending on education and
health has increased on average, with comparable increases for countries that had IMF-supported adjust-
ment programs. Their research provides useful insights into the evolution of social spending in IMF-suppor-
ted programs, but their conclusions are based on a comparison of averages. Our methodology is seeking to
go beyond their work by including statistical controls and dealing with the endogeneity of Fund-supported
programs.ful contribution in an area characterized by much controversy but limited empirical
analysis.
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Box 1. Issues in the Analysis of the Impact of IMF-Supported Programs.
Goldstein and Montiel (1985) identified four desirable characteristics that any methodology
trying to measure the impact of IMF-supported programs should have: (1) It should use infor-
mation for a country “before-and-after” a Fund-supported program and “with-and without”
programs; (2) It should incorporate other domestic and international factors determining out-
comes (control variables); (3) It should consider the determinants of domestic policies (policy
reaction functions), to evaluate what outcomes would have been observed in the absence of
a program; and (4) It should account for selectivity bias (endogeneity of Fund programs) (10).
The approach used in this paper meets only three of the criteria, since we do not discuss ex-
plicitly a policy counterfactual. However, such a counterfactual is less important for the type
of “outcomes” considered here —social expenditures— than for the broad macroeconomic
indicators (e.g. growth, inflation, current account) considered by Goldstein and Montiel and
others. There is also a dilemma of including domestic policy variables (11) among the con-
trols: if they are not included, all their effect would be attributed to the IMF variable. Thus if
countries without an IMF-supported program have better policies, on average, than those
with programs, the estimated effect of the IMF variable would include the negative effect of
bad policies. However, IMF programs affect domestic policies via conditionality and the ge-
neral policy dialogue between the Fund and country authorities. Hence domestic policies are
not exogenous to the presence of a Fund program and using them as controls runs the risk of
ignoring a large part of their potential impact. One way of dealing with this is to use a policy
reaction function as it provides a way of estimating how policies would differ with and wit-
hout a Fund-supported program (12). Our paper does not explicitly include domestic policy
variables, as an initial analysis of the determinants of social expenditures found no significant
association with potential candidates (e.g. different measures of monetary and exchange rate
policies). This omission implies that our analysis does not identify the channels through
which IMF-supported programs affect social expenditures. In practice, we are simply estima-
ting the “total effect” of IMF arrangements, including any potential effect via changes in other
policies which in turn affect social spending. An estimation of the channels (indirect effects)
through which IMF-supported programs may affect social spending was beyond the scope of
this paper.
(10) The paper was mostly concerned with methodological issues, but it also included an empirical
exercise comparing different ways of measuring the impact of IMF-supported programs. Mohsin Khan
(1990) dubbed their approach the “generalized evaluation estimator” (GEE). The name seems to have stuck,
although not always referring to a methodology with the four characteristics discussed above. For example,
Khan emphasizes Goldstein’s and Montiel’s use of a policy reaction function. By contrast, Barro and Lee
(2002) (who did not use this method) focus on the issue of sample selection bias as a defining characteristic
of GEE. It is interesting to note that the empirical application in Goldstein and Montiel did not deal with the
endogeneity issue — they just made some assumptions thought to be sufficient to eliminate the possibility
of any sample selection bias.
(11) E.g. monetary and exchange rate policies.
(12) A different, and perhaps more difficult, question is what is the best way to estimate the policy
reaction function. The method use by Goldstein and Montiel —estimating it with data for non-program
countries— provides some interesting insights but, as the authors themselves recognize, is far from perfect.Social Spending and IMF-supported Programs during 1985-2000
There is considerable variation in the amount of resources that developing coun-
tries devote to public expenditures on health and education. Table 1 summarizes pub-
lic spending levels on health and education measured in four possible ways: per ca-
pita (in US dollars and in local currency units at constant prices), as a share of total
public expenditures, and as a percentage of GDP. Figure 1 compares averages in these
indicators for two groups: country/years when there is an IMF program (“with IMF”)
and the rest (“without IMF”) (13), (14). The averages for the two groups are very close
-- the “with IMF” group being slightly lower when social spending is measured as
share of GDP, and slightly higher when measured as a share of total government ex-
penditures.
This comparison of averages (Figure 1) provides an initial description of levels of
social spending with and without IMF-supported programs; however, this information
is hardly conclusive. For example, it cannot establish whether the differences depicted
in the figure are (statistically) “significant”. Do the different levels of spending reflect
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FIGURE 1
AVERAGE SOCIAL SPENDING “WITH” AND “WITHOUT” THE IMF
(IN PERCENT) (1985-2000)





Health/GDP Health/Expend. Educ/GDP Educ/Expend.
Without IMF With IMF
(13) Years with only part of a program are allocated to each group in proportion to the length of the
period under each of the two conditions. E.g, if country X embarked on an IMF program in September 1,
1990, social spending in 1990 is included in the with and without groups with weights ¼ and ¾, respecti-
vely. Similarly, in the regression analysis, the IMF variable is defined as the share of the year under a Fund
program.
(14) To make all indicators fit in the same scale, the figure shows the index at constant domestic pri-
ces divided by 100; i.e. the average for the 1985-2000 is set to 1.0, instead of 100 as in table 1 and subse-
quent regressions.fundamental differences associated with the presence of a Fund-supported program?
Or are they just random fluctuations for the particular sample of countries and periods
representing each group? In other words, to the extent that other factors that may also
affect spending are not controlled for, the observed differences could be spuriously
associated with the Fund-supported program (15). What is needed, therefore, is a
more explicit statistical analysis, including controls for those variables which may in-
fluence social spending and that are simultaneously associated with the presence of
an IMF arrangement. Before embarking on this analysis, we present some results from
comparing periods with and without Fund program for each particular country, where
the need for control variables is somewhat less pressing (16).
Table 2 summarizes the results for the 92-94 countries for which there is enough
data to compare periods with and without a Fund-supported program. In the majority of
cases there is no statistically significant difference between both periods (17). Among
the cases where there is a significant difference, the measures in shares of GDP or of to-
tal public expenditures show a majority of countries with higher education and health
spending when there is a Fund-supported program, but a majority with lower spending
in terms of US Dollars per capita. At constant domestic prices, more countries show
higher health expenditures and lower education expenditures with an IMF program.
Table 2 thus indicates that in most countries (about 85 percent) there is no pre-
ponderance of evidence to show that social spending levels are systematically higher
or lower during periods with Fund-supported programs. And even in the cases where
the results are significant, the evidence would be stronger if it were possible to control
for other factors which might correlate with periods under an IMF arrangement. As
discussed in the next section, this cannot be done properly with the limited number of
observations available within each country.
One possible solution to the limitations of the country by country analysis is to
combine time series (observations of one unit of analysis at different points in time)
with cross section data (observations of a number of units of analysis at the same point
in time) (18). This would help us draw some empirical conclusions about what is
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(15) For example, IMF-supported programs are more prevalent in lower income countries (the avera-
ge income per capita in the “with IMF” group is US$ 934, about one-third that of the “without IMF” group,
US$ 2,722 which also spend less on health and education in US Dollars per capita, so it is not surprising that
average social spending in US Dollars is smaller in the “with IMF” group.
(16) Ideally, it would have been better to start by running individual country regressions (in a fully
specified model with all the theoretically relevant variables) for each country in the sample. Unfortunately,
the data set covers a limited time period (T=15). Hence, there is a very small number of degrees of freedom
for running individual country regressions, which would make it very difficult to obtain robust results. The
alternative of running the regressions without controls is, to be sure, also problematic. Yet, it is sufficient for
our initial purpose of providing some simple initial results on the basis of intra-country comparisons.
(17) At at least a 90 percent confidence level.
(18) This method of aggregating data has two important advantages. First, it produces a relatively lar-
ge N. Hence, it overcomes the “degrees of freedom” problem that typically affects individual country regres-
sions. This allows the analyst to test for the effect of a large number of independent variables. Second, it
pays attention to both longitudinal and cross-sectional variations, and can therefore produce useful genera-
lizations across both time and space. However, the method also relies on rather stringent assumptions (e.g.
parameter heterogeneity) and can potentially suffer the combined pitfalls of cross-sectional analysis (e.g.
heteroskedasticity) and time-series analysis (e.g. non-stationarity, serial correlation, etc.).likely to happen to social spending for an “average” country with a Fund-supported
program.
III. The Impact of IMF-supported Programs on Social Spending:
A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis
Initial Issues
To estimate the impact of the presence of an IMF-supported program on social
spending, we need to address three potential sources of bias:
(a) Missing variables. It is necessary to include variables that have an independ-
ent effect on spending and that may also be associated with the presence of an
IMF-supported program. Failure to do so would attribute to the presence of a Fund
program, effects that are really the product of these other variables (19). The following
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF COUNTRY REGRESSION RESULTS BY SIGNIFICANCE OF















Countries with (statistically significant) hig-
her spending when there is a Fund Pro-
gram. ....................... 8 13 3 10 8.5
Number of countries with no significant
difference between years with and wit-
hout Fund programs............. 7 8 7 6 8 3 7 5 7 8
Countries with (statistically significant) lo-
wer spending when there is a Fund Pro-
gram. ....................... 74 6 7 6
Education Expenditure variables
Countries with (statistically significant) hig-
her spending when there is a Fund Pro-
gram. ....................... 7 11 1 8 6.75
Number of countries with no significant
difference between years with and wit-
hout Fund programs............. 8 3 7 6 8 6 7 1 7 9
Countries with (statistically significant) lo-
wer spending when there is a Fund Pro-
gram. ....................... 5 8 6 14 8.25
(19) “Omitted variables” bias is one of the most serious problems in econometrics. Unlike other pro-
blems such as heteroskedasiticity, multicollinearity or serial correlation (without a lagged endogenous varia-
ble), omitting relevant variables leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.control variables were defined using data from the World Bank’s World Developent
Indicators and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (see Table A1 in the Appendix for
the summary statistics, including means for the “with IMF” and “without IMF”
groups) (20):
gdpusdpc = GDP per capita in US Dollars
health_priv = private expenditures in health as share of GDP (%)
pop95young = share of the population aged 0-14 (%)
pop95old = share of the population 65 years or older (%)
growth = annual rate of real growth (%)
grw_neg = annual rate of growth, when it is negative (=0 otherwise)
grw_sd = variability (standard deviation) on the rate of growth
ca_y = current account deficit, share of GDP (%)
devaluation = annual change on the real exchange rate (%)
democracy = index of democracy from the Polity IV dataset (21)
The above control variables are important in accounting for the differences in so-
cial spending levels among countries. We discuss briefly the expected impact of some
of these variables. First, we follow most empirical studies of the welfare state by in-
cluding a measure of economic development to control for Wagner’s Law, according
to which industrialization and modernization lead to an expansion of public activity
over private activity. This occurs because in an increasingly complex society, the need
for expenditures on regulatory activities grows. In addition, the demand for collective
or quasi-collective goods —in particular education and culture— tends to be income
elastic (i.e. its demand increases as income grows). As a result, as countries become
wealthier, the state has to increase its supply of these goods, which would otherwise
be undersupplied by the .market (22) Second, our model also includes three measures
of changes in output levels (i.e. the annual rate of real GDP growth, a dummy for
years of negative GDP growth, and a measure of output volatility) that are likely to af-
fect the amount of resources that countries can devote to social spending. Finally, we
also include a variable that measures “democracy” using a numerical scale. The scale
measures the degree to which elections are free and fair and basic civil rights and lib-
erties are respected by the state. Democracy is expected to have a positive impact on
social expenditures for two reasons: (a) in a democratic regime political leaders are
more dependent on the popular vote and, to the extent that social expenditures can
be used to gain the support of important electoral constituencies, politicians are more
likely to increase the resources they allocate to the social sector; and (b) democratic
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(20) Two of the control variables (health_priv and ca_y) had insignificant coefficients and were exclu-
ded from the final regressions.
(21) The index is defined from Gurr’s AUTOC and DEMOC scores: democracy = 1 when
DEMOC–AUTOC> 4, following Brown and Hunter (1999). See also Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001).
(22) Another possible analytic framework to study the relationship between economic development
and the size of the public sector is Baumol’s cost disease. According to Baumol, real wages in the private an
public sectors grow at roughly the same speed. However, because the public sector is labor-intensive and
mainly service-oriented, productivity in this sector grows at a lower speed than in the private sector. Hence,
the relative size of government in the economy grows.regimes tend to have better developed civil societies that can more effectively press
the state for social protection.
These control variables can help explain some of the differences in spending be-
tween countries, but there may be residual country differences in spending not cap-
tured by them. To account for this possibility, the empirical model was also estimated
with fixed effects, which allow for a different level of average spending for each coun-
try (23).
(ii) Serial Correlation and Non-stationarity. Spending on social services tends to
change sluggishly and be heavily affected by the level of spending during previous
periods. This reflects not only the fact that most programs are often conceived as per-
manent or at least spanning several years, but also the political economy of budget al-
location in which most programs have constituencies who resist change. For these rea-
sons, changes in control variables (and Fund-supported programs) are likely to have
an impact which is not instantaneous and may extend beyond one period. Thus, the
empirical analysis should include a richer dynamics that distinguishes between short
and medium term effects on social expenditures.
The empirical analysis addressed this issue by including the following:
 the value of social spending in the previous year (lagged y, or LY), to account
for the dependence of current spending on past allocations.
 the value of all control variables in the previous period (LX), as well as the
change (difference) between current and previous period values (DX). This per-
mits each control variable to have either just a transitory effect on the current
period (variable DX), or an extended effect over several periods..
 similar specification for the presence of a Fund program (lagged and difference:
LIMF and DIMF), which allows for a richer dynamic on the impact of these pro-
grams.
The above variables wew then combined in an Autoregressove Moving Average
process (ARIMA) which was sufficient to obtain independent and identically distribu-
ted residuals (IID). The structural equiation of the ARIMA process is given by
Sit = LSi,t + LXit0 + DXit 1+ 0LIMFit + DIMFit + uit [2]
where L is the lag operator (i.e., LZt = Zt–1, for any variable Z), D is the first-difference
operator (DZt = Zt – Zt–1), and uit are the new independent and identically distribute
residuals (IID), which are not affected by serial correlation. In order to disentangle
short and medium term effects, it is useful for analytical purposes to rewrite equiation
[2] as
DSit = DXit 1 + 1DIMFit +( 1–? ) ( LXit 2 + LIMFit + 2 – LSit)+uit [2a]
where (1 – )2 = 1 and (1 – )2 = 1. In this specification, changes in tehe dependent
explanatory variables (with an impact determined by the coefficientes 1 and 1); and
gradual adjustment to an “equilibrium” level fo spending, detyermined by the coeffi-
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(23) The model was thus estimated using a dummy variables for each country.cients 2 and 2). Transitory changes in the independent variables do not change the
long run “equilibrum” level, so that the effect decays geometricaly at the rate (1 – ) after
the second period.
(iii) Endogeneity of Fund programs. Countries only engage the Fund and agree
to its monitoring when they have an urgent need to access the resources that it provi-
des. Thus, years with a Fund-supported program are not “normal” years. The special
factors leading to the presence of a program could also, in principle, have an indepen-
dent impact on social expenditures. For example, a country could seek a Fund pro-
gram as result of an external crisis (e.g. a large increase in the price of imports or a fall
in export prices), and such a crisis is likely to require a reduction in government ex-
penditures with or without the Fund (24).
To address this issue, the following instruments were used to “predict” the presen-
ce of a program:
 Current account deficit as fraction of GDP in the previous year (as proxy of ex-
ternal crisis).
 Growth in the previous year (proxy of unsustainable expansion?).
 Income per capita (IMF-supported programs less likely on high income coun-
tries).
 Presence of a Fund program in the previous year.
 Government balance as share of GDP in the previous year.
 Democracy index (as in the control variables).
Results
Table 3 presents regression results for the eight definitions of social spending, four
for education and four for health. All eight indicators of health and education expendi-
tures show positive coefficients for the contemporaneous and lagged values of the
IMF variable; only three of the 16 coefficients are not significantly different from zero
at least at a 90 percent confidence level (i.e. *, **, *** represent the 90, 95, and 99 per-
cent confidence intervals), and 5 are significant at 99 percent level. It is interesting that
this seems to reflect a specific effort to protect these types of expenditures, as total pu-
blic expenditures are not significantly different with a without the IMF (see Table A3 in
appendix).
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(24) In the absence of any rigorous way of defining counterfactuals (i.e. deciding what would have
been the level of government social expenditures under a given set of conditions with and without a Fund
program), the standard way to improve the estimation of the coefficients of endogenous variables is to esti-
mate these variable together with the original equation. As the main interest is in the spending equations,
though, we do not need a full estimation of the likelihood of an IMF program: it is enough to estimate the
regression using instrumental variables. It is also not critical to include all the determinants of the IMF varia-
ble, provided that the set of instrumental variables at least includes all the factors which potentially affect
both, the presence of a program and the level of social spending, since these are the factors that biased the
estimate of the IMF variable.260
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Figure 2 uses the regression coefficients from Table 3 to simulate the impact of a
two-year IMF-supported program on health and education spending as share of GDP
and at constant domestic prices. To prevent an excessive sense of precision, it also
shows the results from one of the alternative estimates discussed in next section (Pro-
bit model) (25). The graphs shows the estimated change in education and health ex-
penditures with respect to what they would have been in the absence of the two-year
Fund program. Both types of social spending start to increase the first year of the pro-
gram and have a larger increase in the second year; there is still a residual effect on the
third year (i.e. after the end of the program), which declines geometrically at about 40
percent a year from then on.
The results of Table 3 stand in contrast with the ambiguous results for the group
means in Figure 1 and the country time series reported in Table 2. Thus, it is particu-
larly important to explore their robustness with respect to the estimation methodology
and the country sample. This is the task of the next section.
Robustness of the Results
Table 4 summarizes the results of sensitivity analysis (26). Specifically, we consi-
der the following alternatives:
 Estimation methodology:
1. No correction for serial correlation or endogeneity of Fund programs.
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FIGURE 2








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Health-IV Education-IV
Health-Probit Educat-Probit
Real per capita spending as share








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Health Education
Health-Probit Educ-Probit
(25) A probit model differs from the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimate used in Table 3 in explicitly
constraining the predicted IMF variable to values between zero and one.
(26) See details in Table A1 in the appendix.2. Correction for Serial Correlation but not for endogenous Fund programs.
3. Alternative correction for endogenous programs, to take into account that
the proportion of the year under a program must be between zero and one
(Probit model).
 Sub samples of countries:
S1. Excluding non-users and moderate users: includes countries with at least
one year but no more than six years of Fund programs.
S2. Excluding non-users and chronic users: includes countries with at least
one year but no more than ten years of Fund programs.
S3. Only repeat users: includes countries with five or more years of IMF pro-
grams.
By comparing alternative estimation techniques, i.e. different rows of Table 4, we
see that the first two rows do not produce any strong conclusion about the impact of
Fund programs on spending: either the coefficients are not significant or the number
of positive coefficients are roughly on balance with the negative ones. There are, ho-
wever, interesting differences in the four sub samples results shown in the first row,
comparing spending with and without the Fund for each country separately. Among
countries with five or more years of programs there is a much larger proportion of
countries in which social spending are higher in years with programs. A more detailed
analysis would be needed to evaluate hypothesis of why this is the case (27). But the-
se “repeat users” do have significant influence in the results.
The three lower rows of the table shows that the estimation technique does not
have much effect on the qualitative results about the impact of Fund programs (the
magnitude of the impact does change, as already illustrated in Figure 2).
IV. Conclusions
This paper has argued that the popular view of the IMF leading to dramatic decli-
nes of social spending is not borne out by the available empirical evidence. In fact, the
presence of an IMF-supported program tends to either maintain or increase social
spending in health and education, measured as either a share of GDP, total expenditu-
res or in real per capita terms. The effect is relatively small and short-lived and particu-
larly significant for countries which are continuing (but not necessarily chronic) clients
of the IMF. We found no significant difference between concessional and non-conces-
sional programs. However, our analysis did not include indicators of actual health or
educational outcomes. Hence, we presented no evidence of whether the programs af-
fect the efficiency of delivery of those services or their targeting.
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(27) E.g. it could be that those countries which are frequent clients are more prone to crisis, which
could have a negative impact on social spending. Or the IMF’s, and perhaps associated World Bank’, pro-
grams might have a larger leverage on the composition of spending on these countries more dependent on
their help and advise.263
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
S0: Complete
Sample
(N = 146 countries)
Sub samples according to total time under Fund programs
during 1985-2000
S1: One to Five
years (N=53)
S2: One to Ten
years (N=88)
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CaseOur paper suggests three areas for further research. First, ours is the first attempt
we know of to measure the impact of an IMF-supported program on social expenditu-
re using an econometric model. Measuring the impact of the IMF is a very difficult task
given the existence of a number or well-known statistical problems (e.g. endogeneity
of Fund programs, parameter heterogeneity, serial correlation and unit roots, panel
heteroskedasticity, etc.). Although we have been careful to test for the robustness of
our results in a number of ways, given the number of potential methodological pitfalls
that may affect the study of the impact of IMF-supported programs, the evidence we
present can only be taken as tentative. Researchers that have attempted to measure the
impact of the IMF on key macroeconomic variables (e.g. growth, the current account,
inflation) often get contradictory results that are sensitive to the methodological choi-
ces they make. Hence, our evidence only leads to tentative conclusions. Much more
analytical and empirical work is needed to evaluate more precisely the impact of
IMF-supported programs on social spending.
Second, the main limitation of our study is that it does not allow us to draw any
conclusions about the impact of IMF-supported programs on the poor. As noted, so-
cial expenditures in developing countries vary enormously in terms of their equity, ef-
ficiency and sustainability. One obvious task for further research would be to try to
unbundle the direct and indirect impact of IMF-supported programs on the poor using
social expenditures as an intervening variable. For example, even if IMF-supported
programs managed to maintain constant (or increase slightly) social expenditures du-
ring times of budgetary retrenchment, this might not be particularly helpful to protect
the poor if expenditures on wages and salaries “crowd out” expenditures on goods
and services that more directly benefit the poor. On the other hand, even if social ex-
penditure levels declined, this might not lead to worse poverty indicators if the effi-
ciency or targeting of expenditures increased.
Finally, like all statistical studies, our analysis can point to associations among va-
riables but cannot establish with precision what are the causal mechanisms at work.
Hence, another useful way to expand our research would be to draw evidence from
in-depth case studies where the transmission mechanisms between the presence of an
IMF-supported program, social expenditures and poverty outcomes can be more ef-
fectively and convincingly established.
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TABLE A1
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE CONTROL VARIABLES FOR SOCIAL SPENDING
Variable Description Number
of obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Group means
With IMF Without IMF a/
ca_y current account deficit, share of
G D P( % )................. 2233 –4.610 11.937 –4.620 –4.583
democracy index of democracy xxx ...... 2336 0.519 0.500 0.562 0.409***
deval annual change on the real exchan-
ge rate (%) ............... 2235 4.274 35.062 4.519 3.665
gdpusdpc GDP per capita in US Dollars. . . 2265 2.214 3.075 2.722 0.934***
growth annual rate of real growth (%) . . 2264 2.720 6.791 2.574 3.086
grw_neg annual rate of growth, when it is
negative (=0 otherwise) ....... 2264 –1.275 4.207 –1.444 –0.848***
grw_sd variability (standard deviation) on
the rate of growth .......... 2272 5.250 3.693 5.430 4.794***
health_priv private expenditures in health as
share of GDP (%)........... 994 2.241 1.412 2.206 2.302
pop95old share of the population 65 years or
older (%)................. 2144 5.141 3.217 5.195 5.014
pop95young share of the population aged 0–14
( % ) ..................... 2160 36.860 8.716 36.181 38.482***
population total population (millions) ..... 2265 30.439 124.400 34.930 19.125**
reg_AFR
regional dummy for countries in
each of IMF. Departments: Africa,
Asia and Pacific, Europe I, Europe
II (countries of the former Soviet
Union in Europe and Central Asia)
and Western Hemisphere (Ameri-
ca). AFR is used as reference in the
regressions ...............
2336 0.171 0.377 0.201 0.095***
reg_APD 2336 0.301 0.459 0.244 0.450***
reg_EU1 2336 0.096 0.295 0.108 0.065***
reg_EU2 2336 0.103 0.304 0.103 0.103
reg_WHD
2336 0.205 0.404 0.201 0.217
year Years, from 1985 to 2000...... 2336 1.992.50 4.61 1.992.11 1.993.52***
Note: a/ Statistically significant differences in means are indicated by *** (99% confidence level) or
**(95%).267
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TABLE A2
FUND-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS AND TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING
Total Expenditures
% of GDP USD pc DP pc
L Depend. Var. ............. 0.610*** 0.619*** 0.757***
L.IMF(predict) .............. 0.117 0.050 –0.144
D.IMF(predict).............. 0.001 0.941 0.864
L.gdpusdpc ................ –0.076 1.581 1.116
D.gdpusdpc ............... –0.567 24.923*** 0.582
L.devaluation............... –0.006 0.048 –0.039*
D.devaluation .............. –0.012*** 0.014 –0.060***
L.year.................... –0.068* –0.307 0.231*
L.democracy ............... –0.432 0.268 –1.202
D.democracy............... 0.061 0.180 0.018
L.pop95young .............. 0.769*** –4.386*** 0.599
L.pop95old ................ –0.911 –54.201*** 4.862
L.growth.................. –0.122** 0.203 0.668***
D.growth ................. –0.181*** 0.067 0.122
L.grw_neg................. 0.142 –0.019 0.420
D.grw_neg ................ 0.231** 0.179 0.997***
L.grw_sd.................. –0.754*** 2.230 –0.389
Number of obs ............. 1294 1294 1294
R-squared ................. 0.902 0.983 0.629
Root MSE ................. 3.792 19.54 12.52268
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TABLE A3
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND SUB SAMPLES
Country Years IMF S1 S2 S3
Albania................... 5.71 S1 S2 S3
Algeria ................... 4.81 S1 S2
Angola ................... 0.00
Argentina ................. 11.76 S3
Armenia .................. 4.48 S1 S2
Azerbaijan................. 4.13 S1 S2
Bahamas, The .............. 0.00
Bahrain .................. 0.00
Bangladesh ................ 6.59 S1 S3
Barbados ................. 1.31 S1 S2
Belarus................... 1.00 S1 S2
Belize.................... 1.24 S1 S2
Benin.................... 9.61 S1 S3
Bhutan ................... 0.00
Bolivia ................... 12.10 S3
Bosnia & Herzegovina ........ 1.00
Botswana ................. 0.00
Brazil .................... 6.35 S1 S3
Bulgaria .................. 7.34 S1 S3
Burkina Faso............... 9.77 S1 S3
Burundi .................. 5.26 S1 S2 S3
Cambodia ................. 3.56 S1 S2
Cameroon................. 7.86 S1 S3
Cape Verde................ 1.16 S1 S2
Central African Republic ....... 2.45 S1 S2
Chad .................... 8.23 S1 S3
Chile .................... 3.02 S1 S2
China.................... 0.00
Colombia ................. 1.03 S1 S2
Comoros.................. 2.45 S1 S2
Congo, Dem. Rep. Of ......... 4.42 S1 S2
Congo, Republic of .......... 5.41 S1 S2 S3
Costa Rica................. 6.59 S1 S3
Cote d’Ivoire ............... 10.94 S3
Croatia ................... 4.50 S1 S2
Cyprus ................... 0.00
Czech Republic ............. 1.00
Djibouti .................. 2.37 S1 S2
Dominica ................. 3.05 S1 S2
Dominican Republic .......... 3.63 S1 S2
Ecuador .................. 8.20 S1 S3
Egypt .................... 8.06 S1 S3
El Salvador ................ 6.73 S1 S3
Equatorial Guinea ........... 5.72 S1 S2 S3
Eritrea ................... 0.00
Estonia ................... 6.82 S1 S3
Ethiopia .................. 5.62 S1 S2 S3
Fiji...................... 0.00
Gabon ................... 9.20 S1 S3
Gambia, The ............... 8.55 S1 S3
Georgia .................. 4.08 S1 S2269
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Country Years IMF S1 S2 S3
Ghana ................... 11.78 S3
Grenada .................. 1.64 S1 S2
Guatemala................. 2.59 S1 S2
Guinea ................... 13.38 S3
Guinea Bissau .............. 0.00
Guyana .................. 10.12 S3
Honduras ................. 6.29 S1 S3
Hungary .................. 7.75 S1 S3
India .................... 1.66 S1 S2
Indonesia ................. 3.16 S1 S2
Iran ..................... 0.00
Jamaica................... 9.73 S1 S3
Jordan ................... 9.42 S1 S3
Kazakhstan ................ 6.05 S1 S3
Kenya ................... 6.99 S1 S3
Kiribati ................... 0.00
Korea.................... 4.90 S1 S2
Kuwait ................... 0.00
Kyrgyz Republic............. 7.12 S1 S3
L a oP D R .................. 6.63 S1 S3
Latvia.................... 7.13 S1 S3
Lebanon .................. 0.00
Lesotho .................. 8.72 S1 S3
Liberia ................... 1.43 S1 S2
Libya .................... 0.00
Lithuania.................. 5.74 S1 S2 S3
Macedonia FYR ............. 3.41 S1 S2
Madagascar ................ 9.63 S1 S3
Malawi ................... 10.13 S3
Malaysia .................. 0.00
Maldives .................. 0.00
Mali ..................... 13.38 S3
Malta .................... 0.00
Marshall Islands ............. 0.00
Mauritania................. 12.16 S3
Mauritius.................. 1.50 S1 S2
Mexico ................... 8.30 S1 S3
Moldova .................. 5.29 S1 S2 S3
Mongolia ................. 6.29 S1 S3
Morocco .................. 5.95 S1 S2 S3
Mozambique ............... 10.52 S3
Myanmar ................. 0.00
Namibia .................. 0.00
Nepal.................... 6.24 S1 S3
Netherlands Antilles .......... 0.00
Nicaragua ................. 4.99 S1 S2
Niger .................... 10.96 S3
Nigeria ................... 3.90 S1 S2
Oman.................... 0.00
Panama .................. 7.93 S1 S3
Papua New Guinea .......... 4.60 S1 S2
TABLE A3
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Country Years IMF S1 S2 S3
Paraguay.................. 0.00
Peru..................... 8.27 S1 S3
Philippines ................ 11.92 S3
Poland ................... 5.83 S1 S2 S3
Qatar .................... 0.00
Romania .................. 5.15 S1 S2 S3
Russia ................... 5.37 S1 S2 S3
Rwanda .................. 5.13 S1 S2 S3
Samoa ................... 0.52
Sao Tome & Principe ......... 3.18 S1 S2
Saudi Arabia ............... 0.00
Senegal................... 13.93 S3
Seychelles................. 0.00
Sierra Leone ............... 6.87 S1 S3
Slovak Republic ............. 1.67 S1 S2
Solomon.................. 0.00
South Africa ............... 0.00
Sri Lanka ................. 6.27 S1 S3
St. Kitts and Nevis ........... 0.00




Tajikistan ................. 3.18 S1 S2
Tanzania.................. 10.09 S3
Thailand .................. 4.63 S1 S2
Togo .................... 12.07 S3
Tonga ................... 0.00
Trinidad & Tobago........... 2.07 S1 S2
Tunisia ................... 4.49 S1 S2
Turkey ................... 2.45 S1 S2
Turkmenistan............... 0.00
Uganda................... 11.66 S3
Ukraine .................. 5.08 S1 S2 S3
United Arab Emirates ......... 0.00
Uruguay .................. 8.47 S1 S3
Uzbekistan ................ 1.24 S1 S2
Vanuatu .................. 0.00
Venezuela................. 4.00 S1 S2
Vietnam .................. 3.30 S1 S2
Vincent & the Grenadines ...... 0.00
Yemen ................... 4.60 S1 S2
Zambia................... 7.48 S1 S3
Zimbabwe................. 6.12 S1 S3
TABLE A3
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